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I iii 
If several persons wish to join together in a common 
enterprise in order to pool their capital or labor or some 
of each, they may choose among a variety of avdable 
organizational structures that WLU serve that purpose. The 
most common entity forms are partnerships (including 
joint ventures), corporations, and trusts. Whde, in its 
typical structure, each of those entity forms has its own 
distinct characteristics, the structure of such organiza- 
tions often is modified by agreement so as to adopt 
attributes of another type of entity. Because of this, the 
substantive distinction between entity types is blurred. 
However, tax law's treatment of these entities is dis- 
slmilar in many important respects. For example, part- 
nershps pay no federal income taxes. In this respect, the 
partnership serves as a conduit in that all of its income, 
losses, deductions, credts, and other tax attributes are 
passed through to its partners who report those items on 
their own tax returns. A corporation, on the other hand, 
is subject to a federal income tax. The typical domestic 
corporation is taxed on its income regardless of whether it 
retains that income or dstributes its earnings to its share- 
holders by way of dvidends. Corporate income is some- 
times said to be subjected to a double tax--once when 
earned by the corporation and again when distributed to 
its shareholders. Certain closely held corporations are 
permitted to elect under Subchapter S to be excused from 
income tax liability on most (or perhaps all) of their in- 
come and to have most (or perhaps all) of their income, 
deductions, credits, and other tax items pass through to 
the corporation's shareholders in a manner that is similar 
to the pass-through treatment provided for partnershps 
and partners. Such electing corporations are referred to 
as "S Corporations." Corporations wluch are not S corpo- 
rations are sometimes referred to as "C Corporations." 
UnUe a partnership, a n  S corporation is subjected to 
federal income lax liability in certain narrow c i r m -  
stances, but for the most part, an S corporation will pay 
no federal income taxes. 
A trust is liable for federal income taxes on its retained 
income, but to the extent that the trust makes (or is re- 
quired to make) a current dstribution of its income to its 
beneficiaries, such income will be taxed in the hands of 
the beneficiaries rather than the trust. Thus, a required or 
actual dstribution by a trust will cause all or some of its 
income to be passed through to its beneficiaries, but the 
remaining trust income is taxed to the trust itself. Credts 
generally pass through to the beneficiaries. Deductions 
sometimes pass through and sometimes are a d a b l e  
only to the trust. 
The foregoing cursory description of entities and their 
tax treatment raises several fundamental questions. 
Should the tax treatment of all entities be the same or 
should there be dsparate treatment? K there is to be dis- 
parate treatment, should the treatment depend upon the 
traditional classification of entities as corporations, part- 
nerships, or trusts? If so, should the tax law's charac- 
terization of an organization rest on its characterization 
for local law purposes or should characterization be de- 
termined accordmg to a federally established standard? 
Alternatively, should the tax characterization of an organi- 
zation turn exclusively on an election by the members of 
the organization? 
The tax law's current response to those questions is to 
characterize organizations according to federally created 
standards and to treat each entity type differently. Thus, 
an organization that is treated as a partnership for state 
law purposes may be treated as an association taxable as a 
corporation for tax purposes. The standards employed in 
determining the tax classification of entities were estab- 
lished in the Supreme Court's 1935 decision in Mowissey v. 
Commissioner, and they are sometimes referred to as the 
Morrissey standards. 
. . . an organization that is treated as a 
partnership for state law pur oses may be 
treated as an association taxa le as a cor- 
poration for tax purposes. 
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The lustory of the government's application of the 
Mom'ssey standards to partnerships is instructive in that 
there were dramatic shifts in the government's position as 
the benefits and detriments to taxpayers of corporate tax 
treatment waxed and waned. Initially, the government 
sought to impose corporate tax treatment on partnershps 
to the extent that it could do SO under the Morrisq stan- 
dards. The government's purpose was to maximize the 
reach of the double tax imposition that applies to corpo- 
rate entities but not to partnerships. However, there are 
tax advantages to corporate treatment that mitigate or 
even offset the double tax cost. 
Untd recently, one of the tax advantages of corporate 
classification was a more liberal statutory deferred com- 
pensation treatment for shareholder-employees of a 
closely held corporation than was available to members 
of a partnership. Beginning with the early 1950s, many 
closely held organizations were incorporated for that 
purpose. Since, at that time, state laws prohibited 
professionals from incorporating, some professional 
partnerslups successfully sought to be classified under 
the Morrissey standards as associations that are treated as 
corporations for tax purposes. To combat that effort, in 
1960, the government promulgated regulations which 
adopted the Mowissey standards but construed them in 
such manner as to make it difficult for a partnership to be 
treated as a corporation. Many states responded to the 
1960 regulations by authorizing professionals to incorpo- 
rate, and so was born the "professional corporation." The 
govenunent then promulgated a regulation which set 
forth standards for corporate characterization that were 
designed to exclude professional corporations. After a 
number of courts held tl-us "anti-professional corporation" 
regulatory provision to be invalid, the government 
revoked it in 1977. 
Subsequently, the statutory provisions for deferred 
compensation were altered by Congress so that there is 
little Merence between the provisions for self-employed 
participants and those for employees. That change 
removed one of the major incentives for corporate 
characterization. 
The focus of the characterization h p u t e  shifted once 
again. With deferred compensation plans no longer a sig- 
nificant consideration, the govemment turned its atten- 
tion to the area of tax shelters. Tax sheltered investments 
are designed to provide sheltered income for the inves- 
tors or generate deductions or credts that the investors 
can use to shelter outside income. A corporation typically 
is not a useful entity for the conduct of a tax sheltered 
operation since the tax benefits generated by the corpora- 
tion ulll not pass through to its shareholders. In some 
cases, an S corporation can be useful, but the require- 
ments for quah€ymg as an  S corporation are such that few 
tax shelter operations could qualify. Consequently, a part- 
nership, especially a luruted partnership, form has been 
the most popular entity for conducting such investments. 
. . . the overnment has returned to its 
pre-pro ! essional association position of 
seeking to impose corporate characteriza- 
tion to the broadest extent possible. 
The govemment had sought through legislative pro- 
posals and through litigation to eliminate tax shelters or 
to minimize the tax benefits which such investments are 
designed to obtain. To the same aim, the government has 
sought to prevent investors from securing such tax bene- 
fits by recharacterizing the partnership or trust which 
conducts the sheltering activity as a corporation for tax 
purposes. Thus, the govemment has returned to its pre- 
professional association position of seeking to impose 
corporate characterization to the broadest extent possible. 
As to partnerships, the government's litigating efforts 
were thwarted by the regulations it adopted in 1960, 
which are designed to make corporate characterization 
more difficult to obtain and therefore to impose. In its 
1976 decision in Philip G. Larsen, the Tax Court established 
criteria that make it extremely difficult to reclasslfy a part- 
nership as a corporation, and the Commissioner was con- 
strained to adopt the Larsen position. As a result, 
relatively few limited partnerships are at risk of being 
reclassified, and general partnerships are virtually 
immune. 
Trusts are also vulnerable to reclassification for tax 
purposes. In fact, the Mowissty case itself involved the 
classification of a trust as an association taxable as a 
corporation. The govemment has recently promulgated 
proposed regulations and rulings that would reclasslfy 
certain types of trusts, but, these rules have not yet been 
tested in court. 
In general, incorporated organizations have withstood 
any effort to reclassify them as partnerships or other 
unincorporated entities. However, problems similar to 
characterization have plagued corporate entities. In some 
circumstances, persons who wished to do business as a 
partnershp or as a sole proprietor have had to incorpo- 
rate an activity to satisfy (or to avoid) some state law re- 
quirement. The most common illustration of this is where 
a real estate operation incorporates to obtain a construc- 
tion loan and permanent financing. State usury laws do 
not apply to corporate borrowers. If the permissible rate 
under the usury law is lower than prevailing commercial 
rates, the lender will only make the loan to a corporate 
borrower. To comply with the lender's demand, the land 
is placed in a newly formed corporation whch then bor- 
rows the funds needed for construction. In such cases, 
the charter of the corporate borrower may describe it as a 
"dummy" that was aeated solely to borrow the funds 
needed for construction. The corporation wdl be liqui- 
dated as soon as construction is completed and the per- 
manent financing is obtained. The shareholders have 
then attempted to treat the incorporated entity as a sham 
so that the entity will be ignored for tax purposes and 
the organization treated as a partnershp or sole pro- 
prietorship. With few exceptions, shareholders have been 
unsuccessful in such attempts, and the courts have sus- 
tained the viability of the corporate entity. To obtain part- 
nershp treatment in such cases, the shareholders will 
have to liquidate the corporation whch may cause them 
to incur substantial tax liabhty especially if the corpora- 
tion is deemed to be a collapsible corporation. 
Faced with the Commissioner's and the courts' 
unwillingness to treat such real estate corporations as 
shams, shareholders tried a ddferent approach. They 
formed a corporation to serve as an agent for the share- 
holders, and they transferred title to the realty to the cor- 
poration in its agency capacity. By so structuring the 
transaction, they hoped to permit the corporation to bor- 
row the needed funds without saddling the operation 
with corporate tax treatment. It is a matter of state law 
whether such an arrangement wdl successfully evade 
usury law restrictions. 
The Commissioner generally challenges the vahdty of 
such agency relationshps and contends that the corpora- 
tion is to be treated as the owner of the realty whch it 
purportedly holds as agent for the transferors. The cri- 
teria for determining whether the agency relationship is 
valid were set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in 
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). 
National Carbide established six standards or criteria of 
whch the fifth has proven to be the most important. The 
fifth standard requires that a corporation's agency rela- 
tionshp with its principals not be dependent on their 
shareholder status for the agency relationshp to be 
treated as vahd. Although the Tax Court disagrees, sev- 
eral courts of appeals (the Fourth and Fifth Circuits) have 
held that the fifth standard must be satisfied to obtain 
agency status regardless of whether the other five 
National Carbide standards are met. The Fourth and Fifth 
Cirmits have construed that fifth standard so strictly as to 
make it &f id t  for a corporation to qualify as an agent of 
its shareholders. However, if the transferors of the realty 
to the corporate agent are not the shareholders of the cor- 
poration, or if the shareholders own only a portion of the 
equity interests in the transferred property, the vahdity 
of the agency relationship likely Mrlll be recognized. E.g., 
Moncriefv. United States, 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984). So, 
if a law firm were to form a corporation whch serves as 
an agent of the firm's dents, it appears that the firm 
could borrow the needed funds and construct the 
property without subjecting its principles to corporate tax 
treatment. 
The various tests employed to determine the charac- 
terization of an org&tion are designed to measure the 
extent to which an organization's attributes more closely 
resemble those of one type of entity rather than another. 
Thus. if the characteristics of an oreanization that is 
classified as a h t e d  partnership &der state law more 
closely resemble the attributes of a typical corporation, 
the organization wdl be treated as an association taxable 
LJ 
as a corporation. Given that purpose, there are reasons to 
question whether the Mom'ssey standards are appropriate 
criteria especially in light of the diversity of forms that 
The various tests employed to determine 
the characterization of an organization are 
designed to measure the extent to which 
an organization's attributes more closely 
resemble those of one type of entity 
rather than another. 
are now employed for each of such entities. But a more 
fundamental issue is whether the reclassification of 
entities is justified as a matter of tax policy. In other 
words, there may be no good reason for tax law to clas- 
sify an entity as anythmg other than the classification 
chosen by the taxpayers regardless of the entity's 
characteristics. 
First, let us consider whether there is any jusbfication 
for reclassifying a lunited partnership as a corporation. 
The corporate income that is dstributed to a shareholder 
typically is subjected to double taxation-once in the 
hands of the corporation and again when it is distributed 
to a shareholder. There is substantial support for the view 
that this double taxation of corporate income is undesir- 
able both for reasons of economic policy and of equity. Lf 
it were admmistratively feasible, it would be desirable to 
integrate the corporation's income with the individual 
shareholder's personal income and apply a single tax. 
The Subchapter S provisions demonstrate that in circum- 
stances where the administration of an integrated tax sys- 
tem is manageable, Congress has permitted an election 
to integrate. The principal differences between the Sub- 
chapter S provisions and the provisions of Subchapter K 
(the partnership provisions) are those provisions of Sub- 
chapter S that are designed to prevent a perceived abuse 
where the S election is made by a corporation that had 
previously been operating as a C corporation. Congress 
feared that otherwise the shareholders could obtain the 
future income of the organization free of a corporate tax 
without first having to liquidate the corporation and 
cause the shareholders to recognize gain thereby. The 
provisions in Subchapter S that deal with this problem 
apply only to capital gains and to passive investment 
income. 
So long as the allocation of partnership income among 
the various partners is adrmnistratively manageable, 
there is no reason to impose a double tax on partnershp 
income. The integration of such income with that of the 
partners, as is done by Subchapter K, is unobjectionable. 
Since a corporate organization cannot be converted to a 
partnership without liquidating the corporation, the 
special Subchapter S problems concerning capital gains 
and passive investment income do not arise in the part- 
nership area. 
The major concerns over the classification of limited 
partnerships arise because of a partnership's capacity to 
pass through to its partners favorable tax attributes such 
as artificially created tax losses and tax credits.The part- 
nershp is the favored entity of the infamous tax sheltered 
investments. Tax shelters are spawned by tax preferences 
that typically are deliberately created by Congress for 
some economic or social purpose-e.g., hghly acceler- 
ated de~reciation and investment tax credits. Lf these 
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preferences are designed to encourage certain types of 
investments, it would seem appropriate to permit the 
investments to be made by a group of people joining to- 
gether as well as by a single investor. Indeed, there has 
been no objection to a general partnership's engaging in a 
tax sheltered investment. The attack has been directed at 
h t e d  partnershps because limited partners have no lia- 
bllity to contribute addtional amounts to the partnership 
or to pay its creditors. 
A major objection has been raised to providmg a per- 
son tax benefits, such as depreciation deductions, in an 
amount that exceeds the aggregate contributions of that 
person to the enterprise plus the total liabihty of that per- 
son for addtional contributions. This situation can arise 
as a consequence of the "basis" rules that comprise the 
so-called Crane doctrine for the treatment of nonrecourse 
debt. The problem caused by nonrecourse debt is not 
peculiar to limited partnerships; it can arise where any 
party, even a single individual, acquires property subject 
to a debt for whch the acquiring party is not personally 
liable. There is no reason to deprive a runited partner of 
the tax benefits that flow from the partnership's basis in 
property acquired through a nonrecourse debt. No prop  
erty owner-general partner or sole investor-has any 
greater liability for the repayment of a nonrecourse debt 
than does a lirmted partner. Current law recognizes ths, 
and treats a limited partner the same as a general partner 
in determining the bases that they acquire in their part- 
nershp interests as a result of the partnershp's non- 
recourse debt. 
That is not to say that the w e n t  treatment of non- 
recourse debts is correct. It is merely that there is no 
reason to dstinguish h t e d  partnershps from other 
investors in dealing with such debts. There are some who 
believe that the Crane rule should be modified or even 
repudiated. Regardless of the merits of that contention, 
the problem arises out of the Crane doctrine, and it is that 
doctrine that should be addressed drectly rather than 
making a piecemeal attack on it by reclassifying some 
partnershps as corporations. 
Another means of deahg  with the nonrecourse debt 
problem is the imposition of "at risk" rules such as those 
imposed by #65 and W(c)(8) of the Code. Currently 
those rules are insufficient because there are several areas 
where they do not apply-notably, real estate invest- 
ments. The p e n h g  tax reform bill (H.R. 3838) would 
cure that problem by expanding the scope of the at risk 
rules so that they apply to many (but not all) real estate 
ho lhgs .  The bdl also would repeal the investment tax 
cre&t and reduce the permissible rate of depreciation. 
. . . an ideal tax structure would integrate 
all business income with the personal 
income of the individuals who have the 
beneficial interest in the organization 
The partnership's recourse debts do not open any 
doors to avenues for tax abuse. A limited partner enjoys 
hmited liabihty as to the partnership's recourse debts. A 
partner can deduct his share of partnership losses only to 
the extent of h s  outside basis in his partnership interest 
(§704(d)), and a lirmted partner gets no addition to his 
outside basis because of a partnership's recourse debts. 
Consequently, a h t e d  partneis exemption from liabihty 
precludes him from obtaining any tax benefit from such 
debts, and no tax abuse can occur because of such debts. 
In sum, there is no justification for the Commissioner 
or the courts to challenge the classification of a part- 
nership. The Commissioner has used reclassification as 
an oblique attack against tax provisions that the Commis- 
sioner deems undesirable where a frontal attack on such 
treatment does not seem promising. While the Commis- 
sioner's behavior is understandable, it would be more 
efficient and equitable to require either the courts or the 
legislature to face the underlying problem directly rather 
than to dilute its sigruficance through the reclassifying of 
a relatively few organizations. 
Sirmlarly, it is inappropriate to impose extraordinary 
requirements for a corporation to quahfy as an agent of its 
shareholders. The Tax Court has come to that conclusion, 
but the Commissioner rejeds it, and he has the support 
of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. It is especially inappro- 
priate to impose such requirements where knowledge- 
able parties easily sidestep this obstacle by having a 
corporation which is formed and controlled by the share- 
holders' lawyers hold the property as the transferors' 
agent and obtain the needed financing. 
For the same reasons. the characterization of a trust 
should not be &deng& regardless of whether the bene- 
ficiaries have different types of interests in the trust. One 
problem here is that persons might be able to aeate a 
trust to whch thev each contribute their stock h o l h e s  in 
order to diversify heir portfolio without recognizing 
gain as would be required by §351(e)(l) or §721(b) if the 
transfers were made to a corporation or to a partnership. 
But, that problem exists for fixed investment trusts that 
the regulations acknowledge cannot be reclassified. 
[Treas. Reg. §301.7701-4(c)]. If this is a problem, it should 
be dealt with by amending Subchapter J rather than by 
attempting to reclassify some trusts. 
Another reclassification issue arises where two or more 
persons acquire property as co-tenants and &vide the in- 
come from the property among themselves. In some cir- 
cumstances, the Service W1U seek to impose partnership 
status on that activity, whch classification can have detri- 
mental consequences to one or more of the parties. The 
only justification for imposing partnershp status is to fa- 
cllitate administration of the tax laws. It would seem that 
reclassification as a ~ a r t n e r s h ~  should not be im~osed 
unless the nature oi the coop&ative activity is su& that it 
would be cumbersome to deal with it as representing an 
aggregate of interests rather than as a separate entity. 
However, in determining whether a tenancy in common 
should be reclassified, neither the courts nor the Service 
has addressed that auestion and instead thev seek to I 
resolve this issue according to mechanical standards that 
do not appear to be particularly relevant. 
On the other hand, where several persons attempt to 
characterize an employment or loan arrangement 2 a 
partnership, the government has a legtimate interest in 
ignoring their formal characterization. Tlus is to prevent 
the transmutation of compensation for services or for the 
use of funds, whch would be ordinary income to the 
recipient, into a "partnershp h6ibution" which may 
permit a deferral of income or capital gains treatment. 
Precluding partnership treatment is one means of pre- 
venting such abuses. 
Two auestions more fundamental than entitv reclassi- I 
fication are whether there is any justdication for having 
two ddferent tax schemes for business organizations 
(i.e., a double tax system and a pass-through tax system) 
and, if so, whether the choice of the applicable system 
should depend upon whether the organization is a cor- 
poration or a partnershp. Regarding the first question, as 
previously noted, an ideal tax structure would integrate 
all business income with the personal income of the indi- 
viduals who have the beneficial interest in the organi- 
zation. The major objection to a fully integrated system 
(i.e., a pass-through tax structure) is that the forms of 
equitable ownershp of a corporation can be extremely 
complex. For example, different classes of corporate stock 
can provide ddferent income rights, and there can be 
multiple tiers of corporate engagement in investments. 
A corporate tax system addresses t h s  complexity. 
For many years, the partnership form typically was 
employed in uncomplicated circumstances so the pass- 
through system operated quite well for those organiza- 
tions. The provision of different tax treatment for part- 
nerships is arbitrary in that it excludes those corporate 
enterprises that have uncomplicated forms of shareholder 
ownership and includes partnerships that have complex 
structures. The adoption of an arbitrary line of distinction 
is justified as a means of avoiding the administrative 
chaos that would follow from a rule requiring ad hoc de- 
terminations of the degree of an organization's complex- 
ity. The prejudice to small corporations is alleviated by 
the availability of the Subchapter S election. 
Currently, the forms of ownership of partnership inter- 
ests of some large limited partnerships have become as 
complex as those of many large corporations. The ques- 
tion arises whether such partnershps should be given 
pass-through treatment. The Treasury addressed this 
issue in its first Tax Reform proposal (Treasury I) when it 
proposed to treat a limited partnership with more than 35 
partners as a corporation. This proposal was dropped by 
Treasury when it promulgated its revised version (Treas- 
ury II), sometimes referred to as the President's proposal. 
The number of persons who own an interest in an 
organization should not be a factor in its classification. In 
that regard, the 35 shareholder hnit on S corporations 
should be re-examined. Since the audit process focuses 
on the organization itself, there is no admirustrative diffi- 
culty in applylng pass-through treatment to any number 
of persons provided that they are identified at the entity 
level. 
Another question is whether the tax treatment of an 
organization should be determined by criteria that meas- 
ure the relative difficulty of administering a pass-through 
system rather than by whether the organization is incor- 
porated. Thus, an uncomplicated ownership form 
would have pass-through treatment, and a complicated 
ownership form would have a tax imposed at the entity 
level. Such a system would be extremely difficult to 
administer especially since the ownership of an organiza- 
tion can change from time to time and may thereby 
become more or less complex. The corporate-partnership 
division is a relatively easy one to administer and may 
well be preferable, provided that the typical corporation 
or partnership fits the complex or simple ownership pat- 
tern and provided that provision is made for those organ- 
izations which do not fall within the expected degree of 
complexity or simplicity. The Subchapter S election is a 
good device for dealing with these problems for incorpo- 
rated organizations. It is elective so that an incorporated 
organization which does not wish to be subjected to the 
complexity of the pass-through system (and of the possi- 
ble involuntary termination of pass-though treatment) 
need not have it imposed. While the Subchapter S provi- 
sions were liberalized in 1982, they might be further 
expanded. 
As to the partnership, the pass-through system should 
be retained so long as the typical partnership has an 
uncomplicated ownership structure. As to those part- 
nerships with complex structures, if they impose a sigruf- 
icant administrative burden on the Service to apply pass- 
through treatment, then criteria should be established 
(by legislative action) to impose corporate tax treatment 
for such partnerships. But, if this is necessary, the distinc- 
tion should be based on factors that are easy to ascertain 
even if the result is an arbitrary line of demarcation. The 
criteria that are adopted should be aimed at idenhfymg 
organizations having a complicated form of ownership 
for which it is Micult to administer a pass-through tax 
system. For example, tiered partnership ownerslps 
might present such a problem. To date, however, the 
Service appears able to adrmnister Subchapter K even 
as to the more complex partnership forms. Lf so, the 
pass-though system should be retained for all part- 
nerships, and the restrictions on qualifications for Sub- 
chapter S treatment should be re-examined in light of the 
experience with administering the more complicated 
forms of partnership structures. H 
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